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Abstract
This paper proposes a generalization of the Calvo wage-setting equation, which embeds labor
market frictions in the form of a Nash wage bargain. Adding labor market frictions changes
significantly the dynamics of the standard wage-setting equation, such that it may have
non-trivial implications for the design of optimal monetary policy, and could improve the
ability of a general equilibrium model to replicate important labor market stylized facts.
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Adding staggered nominal wage contracts to standard New Keynesian models has been regu-
larly used in recent discussions of monetary policy. In particular, a host of dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium (DSGE) models use the microfounded Calvo wage-setting formulation ﬁrst
introduced in Erceg et al. (2000).1 Such a setting is a crucial input for researchers who wish
to characterize optimal monetary policy and, as pointed out in Rabanal and Rubio-Ramırez
(2005), can help to produce a more accurate replication of observed inﬂation dynamics. Sep-
arately, the presence of labor market frictions in the form of wage bargaining has been well
established as empirically important feature of many economies.2 They have proved to be
important for the design of monetary policy3 and, as emphasized by Hall (2005), to be a
crucial feature of models that seek to replicate important labor market stylized facts.
In this paper, we combine these two branches of the literature and provide a full description
of a Calvo wage-setting equation which embeds labor market frictions in the form of a Nash
wage bargain. We then study how labor market frictions aﬀect the dynamics of a standard
calibrated version of the Calvo wage-setting equation.
2 The Calvo wage-setting with labor market frictions
2.1 Optimal wage decision
To keep the model analytically simple, and directly comparable with previous studies, we
adopt set-up and notation similar to Erceg et al. (2000), which derive a prototype Calvo
wage-setting equation. In what follows, we characterize the wage-setting bargain between
households and ﬁrms.
Every ﬁrm hires Kt+j units of capital and Nt+j(h) units of labor from the household to
manufacture Yt+j(h) units of good according to the constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglass
technology Xt+jKα
t+jNt+j(h)1−α,w h e r eXt+j is the level of total factor productivity. The
wage is the outcome of a Nash bargaining process between households and ﬁrms. Wage
inertia is introduced by Calvo-style staggered contracts. From the perspective of an individual
1See, among others, Huang and Liu (2002), and Harrison et al. (2005) and references therein.
2See Nickell (1997) and references therein.
3See, for recent examples, Blanchard and Gali (2006), and Zanetti (2005).
1household, the wage set at time t applies with probability 1 in t, with probability ξw in t+1
and so forth. Also, in each period, a constant fraction of households 1−ξw is chosen to reset
their contract wages. We assume that whenever household h is not chosen to change its wage
she updates her contacts at the gross steady-state inﬂation rate Π, so that wages are updated
a c c o r d i n gt ot h er u l eWt+j(h)=ΠjWt(h). When the household is chosen to set her wage in
period t + j, she bargains with the associated ﬁrm and chooses the wage, {Wt(h)}
∞
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where β is the discount factor, UC,t+j the marginal utility of consumption, Pt+j the aggregate
price index, V (Nt+j(h),Z t+j) the disutility of working which depends on Nt+j(h), the hours
worked, and Zt+j, a leisure shock. In equation (1), the ﬁrst term in square brackets represents
the surplus to households from working, and the second term the ﬁrm’s proﬁts. The parameter
δ reﬂects the parties’ relative bargaining power, and 0 <δ<1. The advantage of using a Nash
baragain is that the outcome of the bargain is privately eﬃcient–the choice over employment
coincides with that of a market without frictions–and the wage is set to split the surpluses
from employment.



















[UC,t+jFt,t+1Et(h)Nt+j(h) − V (Nt+j(h),Z t+j)]},
where Et(h)=Wt(h)/Wt,a n dFt,t+1 = WtΠj/Pt+j. Equation (2) states that the household’s
weighted optimal condition for employment maximization, multiplied by the ﬁrm’s surplus
2from labor must equal the ﬁrm’s weighted proﬁt maximization condition multiplied by the
household’s surplus from labor. Note that if the weight disappears, δ → 1, there is no longer
any real bargaining, as in the standard case, and so expression (2) reduces to the standard












In this instance, the household would set the wage so that the expected discounted marginal
reward of working equals the expected discounted marginal sacriﬁce of working.4
2.2 The Calvo wage-setting equation under labor frictions














(1 − α)XKN−α(b xt+j − αb nt+j(h)) − F(b ft,t+1 + b et(h))
i
,
where a hat on a variable denotes the log-linear deviation from its steady-state, and L =
XKαN1−α−FN,a n dS = UCFN−V .5 The total demand for the household’s labor, Nt(h)=
[Wt(h)/Wt]
−(1+θw)/θw Nt,i m p l i e st h a tb n(h)t+j = b nt+j + η(b et(h)+gt,t+j),w h e r eη = −(1 +
θw)/θw, for each household h whose price contract signed at date t remains in eﬀect at date t+
j. Log-linearizing the household’s marginal disutility of working, Vnt [Nt(h),Z t]=−[1 − Nt(h) − Zt]
−κ,
around the steady-state, we can write b Vnt (h)=χ(ΘNb n(h)t + ΘZzt), and averaging across
households, b Vnt = χ(ΘNb nt + ΘZzt),w h e r eΘN = N/(1 − N − Z) and ΘZ = Z/(1 − N − Z).
If we deﬁne Gt,t+1 = WtΠj/Wt+j, the real wage deviation from the steady-state is b ζt+j =
b ft,t+j−gt,t+j,a n dgt,t =0 . Log-linearizing the household’s labor supply we can write her mar-
ginal rate of substitution as d mrst = b Vt − b UC,t. Substituting these relationships into equation
(3) yields
4In this formulation, as in Erceg et al. (2000), it is assumed that the government subsidizes labor at the
rate τw = θw.
5No that, in the steady-state, E =1 ,a n dF = W/P = −Vn/UC =( 1− α)XKN
−α.
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(βξw)j (δLFUC + δLVn) b Vnt+j =0 . (4)
Finally, to express equation (4) in terms of deviation of wage inﬂation from its steady-
state, b ωt, we need to consider the aggregate wage Wt =( 1− ξw)Wt(h)+ξw(Wt−1 + Π).
Its log-linearized deviation from the steady-state implies b et(h)=[ 1 /(1 − ξw)]b ωt.U s i n gt h i s
relationship, we account for the fact that in steady-state FUC = −Vn, bring equation (4)
forwards by one period, multiply the result by βξw, subtract the outcome from equation (4),
use the expression for the log-linearized marginal product of labor, d mplt = b xt − αb nt(h),a n d
rearrange, yielding
b ωt = βEtb ωt+1 +
δNWUc
P












P ], and H = Uc
W
P N − V.
Equation (5) links current wage inﬂation to expected future wage inﬂation, a term repre-
senting the diﬀerence between the marginal rate of substitution and the real wage, (d mrst−b ςt),
and a term representing the diﬀerence between the real wage and the marginal product of
labor, (b ςt−d mplt). In models with staggered wage-setting such as Erceg et al. (2000), equation
(5) appears in a simpliﬁed form with δ → 1, such that the coeﬃcient of the second term is
diﬀerent and the third term disappears. Since wage inﬂation is an important input to most
standard microfounded welfare functions, this enriched formulation would probably alter the
policy a monetary authority needs to implement to achieve a Pareto-optimum equilibrium.
This formulation changes signiﬁcantly the dynamics of the wage inﬂation. For simplicity,
we can re-write equation (5) as b ωt = βEtb ωt+1 + a1(d mrst −b ςt)+a2(b ςt − d mplt),w h e r ea1 =
(δNWUcκω)/P and a2 =[ ( 1 − δ)HWκω]/P. Hence, the dynamics of the wage inﬂation
4therefore depend on the values of the coeﬃcients a1 and a2. To understand how coeﬃcients
a1 and a2 vary with the household’s wage bargaining power, we report some illustrative
numerical results. Values for δ are in the range of (0,1). The other parameter values, as in
Erceg et al. (2000), are β =0 .99, α =0 .3, χ = σ =1 .5, ξω =0 .75, θw =1 /3, Q =0 .32,
X =4 .02, Z =0 .03, K =3 0 Q, N =0 .27, Y =1 0 Q.A s w e i n c r e a s e δ,t h ev a l u eo fa1
increases, while that of a2 decreases. Some illustrative results that show how the coeﬃcients
a1 and a2 vary for diﬀerent values of δ are given in Table 1.
Table 1. Values of a1 and a2 as a function of δ
δ 00 .20 .40 .60 .81
a1 00 .0004 0.0011 0.0023 0.0054 0.0259
a2 0.0081 0.0079 0.0078 0.0074 0.0064 0
As Table 1 shows, even a small change in the household’s wage bargaining power aﬀects the
coeﬃcients a1 and a2 signiﬁcantly, particularly relative to the case in which there is no wage
bargain. In fact, when δ =0 .8 rather than 1,t h ec o e ﬃcient a1 decreases by approximately
80%,w h i l ea2 increases substantially (from 0 to 0.0064). Once the wage bargain is introduced
(δ 9 1), a1 and a2 become less sensitive to changes in δ. For instance, in response to a
reduction of around 20% in the degree of wage bargaining power, such that δ =0 .6 rather than
0.8,t h ec o e ﬃcient a1 decreases by approximately 60%,w h i l ea2 increases by approximately
20%.
3C o n c l u s i o n
This paper proposes a full speciﬁcation of the Calvo wage-setting equation, based on a Nash
wage bargain. The equation nests the prototype Calvo wage-setting equation as a special case,
and extends the analysis to incorporate the eﬀect of labor market frictions. In this way, the
standard wage-setting equation is enriched by a parameter for the household’s wage bargaining
power, and an extra term for the marginal product of labor. These change signiﬁcantly the
dynamics of the standard wage-setting equation, such that they may introduce additional
constraints for the design of optimal monetary policy, and may improve the ability of a
DSGE model to replicate important stylized facts in the data. The detailed investigation of
these implications is open for future research.
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